British newspapers, in my experience, leave far too many questions unanswered by not giving appropriate contextual and background data.
So in the light of a mini-media storm (https://x.com/search?q=family%20voting&src=typed_query&f=top – mostly the usual divisive bots, of course) where Democracy Volunteers (a group I’d never heard of) reported – immediately after polls closed – many observations of ‘family voting’ (something I’d never heard of under that term), I decided to do some research – the lazy way, via ChatGPT.
Main piece in the Guardian (which ought really to be better)
This is my third or fourth prompt, building on things I learned from other social media and the early responses. My actual prompt (I can’t share the link as I have ‘workspace’ ChatGPT, open to share with colleagues only):
Tell me about the organisation Democracy Volunteers, their founding, key figures and their public profile/political views, funding, arrangements with the electoral commission, what and how they observe in polling stations.
And tell me what ‘family voting’ is and, if it is both observable and a criminal offence, why it is not stopped in polling stations? Is ‘family voting’ a formal/legal term? Explain the obligations of polling staff, in particular (a) what polling staff are expected to do when they see potential family voting, from (b) what would typically meet the criminal threshold under the 2023 Act.
Tell me why no intervention happened during polling hours in the Denton and Gorton byelection, and why Democracy Volunteers reported after polling was close and (as it appears) in the press, not to the polling station staff or to the Returning Office?
And finally, if Democracy Volunteers are tracking the impact of Voter ID, did their published reports also include reference to these impacts, as well as ‘family voting’?
______________
ChatGPT response:
Organisation: Democracy Volunteers
What it is. Democracy Volunteers is a UK-based domestic election observation organisation. It describes itself as ‘non-partisan’ and says its observers must be politically impartial. (Democracy Volunteers)
Founding and growth.
The group says it was founded in 2015 and marked ‘a decade’ in 2025. (Democracy Volunteers) Their main UK work is deploying trained volunteers to observe polling stations (and sometimes postal vote processes and counts) and then publishing statistical write-ups and recommendations. (Democracy Volunteers)
Key figures.
Their Director/Executive Director is Dr John Ault (their site gives a short bio and links him to election observation and past UK civic/political roles). (Democracy Volunteers) Their public profile also includes support and engagement from Lord Robert Hayward (a Conservative peer) in connection with the Ballot Secrecy Act 2023 and ‘family voting’. (UK Parliament Committees)
Public profile and ‘political views’.
On paper, the organisation’s line is neutrality: accredited observers are required to be politically impartial (that is part of the Electoral Commission regime, not just DV branding). (Electoral Commission) In practice, individual people around the organisation have personal political histories (for example, John Ault’s biography is publicly discussed elsewhere), but that is separate from the formal requirement on accredited observers to be impartial while observing. (Electoral Commission)
Funding.
DV states it receives no state funding; it says it is supported by donations and fundraising, and that observers are volunteers (sometimes funded by DV grants, sometimes at their own cost). (Democracy Volunteers) External funders do exist: the Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust (JRRT) has publicly described grant support for DV’s election observation work (including a commitment “through to July 2025”). (Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust) DV has also used public crowdfunding for specific observation activity (example: a 2024 crowdfunder page). (Crowdfunder UK) If you want hard numbers and income sources by year, the best place is DV’s Companies House filings (they are incorporated as DEMOCRACY VOLUNTEERS LIMITED). (Companies House)
Arrangements with the Electoral Commission.
The Electoral Commission accredits individual observers and observer organisations under electoral law, keeps the public registers, and sets/enforces a Code of Practice that accredited observers must follow. (Electoral Commission) Returning Officers also have a legal duty to ‘have regard’ to the Commission’s Code when managing observers. (Electoral Commission)
What DV observe in polling stations, and how. The Commission’s Code is the baseline: accredited observers may observe the poll, the issue/receipt of postal ballot papers, and the count. (Electoral Commission) DV’s own reports describe a fairly standard method: small teams visiting many stations, staying around 30–45 minutes, and recording structured observations (often via an online survey) for later analysis. (Democracy Volunteers)
‘Family voting’: what it is, and whether it is a legal term
Meaning in plain English. ‘Family voting’ is a loose label for situations where one voter is accompanied into (or closely ‘shadowed’ at) the polling booth by another person in a way that appears to compromise secrecy and/or enables direction or pressure. It is not a precise legal term in itself; it is a campaign/observation term used in policy discussions and observer reporting. (Legislation.gov.uk)
What the law actually says (Ballot Secrecy Act 2023).
The Ballot Secrecy Act 2023 inserted a new offence into the Representation of the People Act 1983: ‘Influencing voters at polling booths’ (new section 62C). The offence is about (a) being with someone at a polling booth, or (b) being near a booth while another person is voting, with intent to influence how they vote or whether they vote. It is punishable (on summary conviction) by up to 6 months’ imprisonment and/or a fine (with slightly different fine wording across UK nations). (Legislation.gov.uk)
So, is ‘family voting’ automatically a criminal offence?
Not automatically. The criminal threshold in the 2023 Act is intent to influence. Two people being near a booth can be suspicious, but it is not the offence unless the intent element is made out. The Act also makes clear that lawful assistance to a voter (under the relevant election rules) is not the same thing as ‘influencing’. (Legislation.gov.uk)
Why it is often not ‘stopped’ in polling stations (even if observable).
Three practical reasons tend to dominate.
First, the booth is designed to block observation. Staff often only see people enter together, not what is said or done at the moment of marking the ballot. That matters because the offence is about intent to influence. (Legislation.gov.uk)
Second, there are legitimate accompaniment scenarios. A disabled voter may be assisted by a companion (subject to process), and children can be present. Staff are expected to distinguish these from interference, in real time, without escalating unnecessarily. (Electoral Commission)
Third, enforcement is messy. The Presiding Officer must keep order, but if somebody refuses instructions or a situation becomes confrontational, it may require police support to remove someone, and staff will often prioritise safety and continuity of the poll while recording and escalating through the Returning Officer. (Legislation.gov.uk)
What polling staff are obliged to do when they see potential ‘family voting’
Here I’m describing the expected practice that follows from the legal framework and the Commission’s polling station handbook guidance, rather than pretending there is one magic paragraph called ‘family voting procedure’.
Baseline duties in the polling station. The Presiding Officer is responsible for maintaining order and for ensuring the secrecy and security of the ballot. (Electoral Commission) They have a legal power to have a person removed if they misconduct themselves or fail to obey lawful orders in the polling station. (Legislation.gov.uk)
Who should be allowed into the booth with a voter. Commission guidance for polling station staff is explicit that only children, or a properly authorised companion of a disabled voter (who has completed the required declaration), should accompany a voter into the polling booth. (Electoral Commission) That is the operational line staff can apply immediately, without needing to prove anyone’s intent.
What staff are expected to do when they see potential interference at the booth. Typically:
- Intervene early and politely. Tell the companion they cannot be in the booth area and must step away. Offer a separate booth. Keep it calm.
- Check whether it is a lawful assistance case. If the voter says they need help because of disability, staff apply the assistance process (companion declaration etc). If not, the companion leaves the booth area.
- If the companion refuses or keeps returning, treat it as a polling station order/discipline issue first (clear instruction; warn of removal), then escalate via the Presiding Officer to the Returning Officer, and if needed call police support. The Presiding Officer has the power to order removal for misconduct/failure to obey lawful orders. (Legislation.gov.uk)
- Record what happened. Even if it is resolved, staff normally log incidents so the RO can see patterns across stations.
What would ‘typically’ meet the criminal threshold under the Ballot Secrecy Act 2023.
Because the offence is intent-based, the clearest cases are where staff can point to behaviour that evidences directing or pressuring, not just accompanying. Examples (non-exhaustive):
• A companion is in the booth and is seen pointing at the ballot, instructing, or preventing the voter from marking privately.
• A companion repeatedly positions themselves right at the booth entrance and appears to monitor the marking, combined with verbal direction.
• The voter indicates they are being told how to vote, or appears distressed and says they cannot vote alone.
Those are the kinds of situations where staff would reasonably think ‘this may be influencing’, and escalate fast, while also keeping the vote secret (staff must not look at the ballot). The statutory test itself is the ‘with/near a polling booth + intends to influence’ test in section 62C. (Legislation.gov.uk)
Denton and Gorton by-election: why no intervention during polling hours, and why DV reported after close
What is publicly reported. In the Gorton and Denton by-election (polling day 26 February 2026), Democracy Volunteers said they observed 32 instances of ‘family voting’ across 15 of 22 polling stations visited, and said it was the highest level they had recorded. (The Guardian) Manchester City Council said its staff had been trained to look for voter interference and that no concerns were reported or raised with them while polls were open; it criticised the group for raising it after the event. (The Guardian) DV also said it rarely issues a report on election night, but did so because the level recorded was unusually high compared to other by-elections. (The Guardian)
Why no intervention happened, in a literal sense. Based on the public accounts above, the proximate reason is: the Returning Officer operation says no issues were raised to them during the day, so nothing was triggered centrally. (The Guardian) That does not prove nothing happened in any station; it’s just what is on record publicly so far.
Why DV might report after close rather than to polling station staff/RO in the moment.
I can’t read minds, but there are two relevant facts.
First, observers are allowed (and encouraged) to give feedback, and the Commission’s Code says observers may bring irregularities or significant problems to the attention of election officials ‘on the spot’ in a non-obstructive way, but the provision of feedback is voluntary. (Electoral Commission)
Second, DV’s model is statistical reporting (they visit many stations briefly, then aggregate). That pushes them towards checking consistency and writing up rather than arguing a single incident with a Presiding Officer. Still, where something is ongoing and serious, the Code clearly envisages on-the-spot flagging. (Electoral Commission)
If you’re asking for the ‘real’ answer to ‘why didn’t they tell the Presiding Officer in station X at time Y?’, I have not seen any public DV document yet that sets out a station-by-station escalation log for this by-election. The Guardian piece reports the council’s criticism and DV’s choice to publish quickly, but not a detailed escalation trail. (The Guardian)
Voter ID impacts in DV reporting
Yes, DV reports have included Voter ID impacts. In their published final report on the England and Wales local/mayoral/PCC elections in May 2024, they report (from their observed sample) the proportion turned away for lacking accepted photo ID (2.1% in their observed sample), and they also report demographic observations (for example, their observers’ assessment that 70% of those turned away were ‘non-white passing’, and 63% were women). (Democracy Volunteers)
In the Gorton and Denton by-election coverage, DV is also described as looking at both ‘family voting’ and the impact of the ID requirement. (The Guardian)
If you want, I can pull out every place DV mentions Voter ID alongside ballot secrecy/family voting across 2023–2025 reports, but it will be a bit list-like. The May 2024 final report is a clean, citable starting point. (Democracy Volunteers)
chosen path 